The District points out that because it receives federal funding, it is prohibited from taking any action which has a discriminatory effect on participation in educational programs. Since school assignments decided purely on the basis of distance from the school would mean that few minority students would be admitted to the most popular schools, the District contends it is required to take steps to integrate the schools. In support of the argument that reducing racial isolation is a compelling interest, the District points to the U.S. Department of Educations Magnet School Assistance Program (MSAP). (rejecting argument that strict scrutiny should be applied only to classifications that disadvantage minorities, stating [r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examination). Voluntary cessation does not moot a case or controversy unless 'subsequent events ma[ke] it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur,'", First, "remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination.". 618206(f)(1), as amended 2007 Ark. The dissents proposed testwhether sufficient social science evidence supports a government units conclusion that the interest it asserts is compellingcalls to mind the rational-basis standard of review the dissent purports not to apply, post, at 36-37. [14], Neither school could plead this compelling interest, because "[w]e have emphasized that the harm being remedied by mandatory desegregation plans is the harm that is traceable to segregation, and that 'the Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without more. In other words, it will always be important for students to learn cooperation among the races. & Rodgers, Coercion to Compliance: Southern School Districts and School Desegregation Guidelines, 38 J. Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are benign or remedial and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Richmond v. J. See id., at 2428. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 507 (1989); Bakke, 438 U. S., at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.) As the Court explains, a school with 50 percent Asian-American students and 50 percent white students but no African-American, Native-American, or Latino students would qualify as balanced, while a school with 30 percent Asian-American, 25 percent African-American, 25 percent Latino, and 20 percent white students would not. Ante, at 1516; see also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in No. See Hallinan, Diversity Effects on Student Outcomes: Social Science Evidence, 59 Ohio St. L.J. Is it not a fact that the very strength and fiber of our federal system is local self-government in those matters for which local action is competent? Roberts (Parts I, II, IIIA, and IIIC), joined by Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, Roberts (Parts IIIB and IV), joined by Scalia, Thomas, Alito, Breyer, joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg. Studies suggest that children taken from those schools and placed in integrated settings often show positive academic gains. Compare Green v. School Bd. But what about Seattles? Cf. 1, p.14 (We advocate only a concept of constitutional law that permits determinations of state and local policy to be made on state and local levels. Moreover, these cases are not governed by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 328, in which the Court held that, for strict scrutiny purposes, a government interest in student body diversity in the context of higher education is compelling. 2d 304 (quoting Bakke, supra, at 315, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 57 L. Ed. I do not understand why this Courts cases, which rest the significance of a unitary finding in part upon the wisdom and desirability of returning schools to local control, should deprive those local officials of legal permission to use means they once found necessary to combat persisting injustices. VII, 1, ch. 1, 458 U. S., at 472473. The debate is not one we need to resolve, however, because it is clear that the racial classifications employed by the districts are not narrowly tailored to the goal of achieving the educational and social benefits asserted to flow from racial diversity. "[5] He went on to say, "What the government is not permitted to do, absent a showing of necessity not made here, is to classify every student on the basis of race and to assign each of them to schools based on that classification. 439 U. S., at 1383. The allocation of governmental burdens and benefits, contentious under any circumstances, is even more divisive when allocations are made on the basis of individual racial classifications. No. In fact, without being exhaustive, I have counted 51 federal statutes that use racial classifications. aspx? 05-908, was filed by a group of parents who had formed a nonprofit corporation to. Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d, at 1192. That, too, strongly supports the lawfulness of their methods. See Powell 35. As I have explained elsewhere, the remedies this Court authorized lower courts to compel in early desegregation cases like Green and Swann were exceptional. However, shortly after we dismissed the Massachusetts suit for want of a substantial federal question, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed course and upheld its statute in the published decision that Justice Breyer extensively quotes in his dissent. b. explicitly overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. 420, p.25. Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. Decisions to assign students to schools within each cluster are based on available space within the schools and the racial guidelines in the Districts current student assignment plan. Id., at 38. Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens). The plan required that each elementary school in the district maintain 20% to 40% enrollment of African-American students, corresponding to the racial composition of the district. The second government interest we have recognized as compelling for purposes of strict scrutiny is the interest in diversity in higher education upheld in Grutter, 539 U. S., at 328. of Boston v. Board of Education, 389 U. S. 572 (1968) (per curiam) (dismissing for want of a federal question a challenge to a voluntary statewide integration plan using express racial criteria). 2d 753, 762764 (WD Ky. 1999). For the dissent, in contrast, individualized scrutiny is simply beside the point. Post, at 55. Does it insist upon especially strong evidence supporting inclusion of multiple minority groups in an otherwise lawful government minority-assistance program? This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its historic commitment to creating an integrated society that ensures equal opportunity for all of its children. In a separate conference, JCPS Representative Pat Todd emphasized that the current assignment plan would remain in effect for the 20072008 school year, citing the finalization of budgets, staffing, assignments and busing as prevailing reasons for no change being logistically possible. 393, 407 (1857) ([T]hey [members of the negro African race] had no rights which the white man was bound to respect). In 1956, two years after Brown made clear that Kentucky could no longer require racial segregation by law, the Louisville Board of Education created a geography-based student assignment plan designed to help achieve school integration. The justification for race-conscious remedies in McDaniel is therefore not applicable here. v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261, 266 (CA1 1965); Pennsylvania Human Relations Commn v. Chester School Dist., 427 Pa. 157, 164, 233 A. To the contrary, Jefferson County in its briefing has explained how and when it employs these classifications only in terms so broad and imprecise that they cannot withstand strict scrutiny. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971) (emphasis added). The dissent points to data that indicate that black and white students in desegregated schools are less racially prejudiced than those in segregated schools. Post, at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). The new plan permitted each student to choose the school he or she wished to attend, subject to race-based constraints. The group also asserted an interest in not being forced to compete in a race-based system that might prejudice its members children, an actionable form of injury under the Equal Protection Clause, see, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200, 211. That policy was necessary because of numerous incidents of racial violence. Id., at 502; id., at 532534 (Thomas, J., dissenting). See supra, at 12. Pp. See supra, at 12. It contains 34 countywide districts with central cities (the 11 Florida districts fit this description, plus Clark County, Nevada and others) and a small number of consolidated districts (New Castle County, Delaware and Jefferson County, Kentucky). Indeed, in its brief Seattle simply assumes that the educational benefits track the racial breakdown of the district. 06AppsChoicesBoardApril2005final.pdf. We have emphasized that the harm being remedied by mandatory desegregation plans is the harm that is traceable to segregation, and that the Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without more. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 280, n.14 (1977). 2 Id., at 151152; Hanawalt 3738; Seattle School Dist. Public schools may not use race as the sole determining factor for assigning students to schools. People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. Again, however, the evidence supporting a democratic interest in racially integrated schools is firmly established and sufficiently strong to permit a school board to determine, as this Court has itself often found, that this interest is compelling. Moreover, these cases are not governed by Grutter v. No. Today, they are not. Upon Joshuas enrollment in middle school, he may again be subject to assignment based on his race. It then created a mixed student body by assigning to those schools students who would otherwise attend predominantly white, or predominantly black, schools elsewhere. Here, Roberts provides the following string citation: Here Roberts cites: "See 539 U.S., at 320, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 156 L. Ed. A non-profit group, Parents Involved in Community Schools (Parents), sued the District, arguing that the racial tiebreaker violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Washington state law. Here, the context is one in which school districts seek to advance or to maintain racial integration in primary and secondary schools. My view of the Constitution is Justice Harlans view in Plessy: Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537, 559 (1896) (dissenting opinion). 1819 (The truth of the matter is that this is an attempt to place local mores and customs above the high equalitarian principles of our Government as set forth in our Constitution and particularly the Fourteenth Amendment. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U. S. 900, 920 (1995), and I shall subject the tailoring of their plans to rigorous judicial review. Grutter, 539 U. S., at 388 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 2002). to achieve its own ends; and thus it fails to pass strict scrutiny. In the Seattle case, the school district has gone further in describing the methods and criteria used to determine assignment decisions based on individual racial classifications, but it has nevertheless failed to explain why, in a district composed of a diversity of races, with only a minority of the students classified as white, it has employed the crude racial categories of white and non-white as the basis for its assignment decisions. The districts also vary in their racial compositions and levels of segregation. Independent School Dist., 719 S.W. 2d 350, 352-353 (Ct. App. This case is the last of a trilogy of cases against Jefferson County Public Schools (JCPS), including McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools,[8] and their use of race in assigning students to schools. . See Hallinan & Williams, Interracial Friendship Choices in Secondary Schools, 54 Am. For the 20012002 school year, the deviation permitted from the desired racial composition was increased from 10 to 15 percent. As we have held, one form of injury under the Equal Protection Clause is being forced to compete in a race-based system that may prejudice the plaintiff, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200, 211 (1995); Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. The School District relies on Grutter in describing the educational benefits of a diverse student body as (1) instilling the civic virtue of cross-racial understanding; (2) creating better-informed citizens by exposing students to a wide range of viewpoints; and (3) enabling students to achieve more success. Reply Brief for Petitioner in No. See also Quillian & Campbell 541. Seattle School District No. The dissent refers repeatedly and reverently to integration. However, outside of the context of remediation for past de jure segregation, integration is simply racial balancing. The first case started in 1998 when five African American high school students sued JCPS to allow them to attend Central High School, a magnet school. By this term, I mean the school districts interest in eliminating school-by-school racial isolation and increasing the degree to which racial mixture characterizes each of the districts schools and each individual students public school experience. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION etal. Here Roberts provides the following string citation: quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270, 123 S. Ct. 2411, 156 L. Ed. 05-915 v. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. 45 (Dec. 19, 1991) (1991 Memorandum). ); internal quotation marks omitted). PICS did not respond to this argument in either of its reply briefs. Jefferson County Public Schools operates the public school system in metropolitan Louisville, Kentucky. At the same time, the plan provided that a previous black school would remain about 50% black, while a previous white school would remain about two-thirds white. Parents Involved VII, supra, at 1166. The District contends that these requirements are not met in this case. Parents Involved . It reported that most districts92 of them, in factadopted desegregation policies that combined two or more highly race-conscious strategies, for example, rezoning or pairing. App. To uphold these programs the Court is asked to brush aside two concepts of central importance for determining the validity of laws and decrees designed to alleviate the hurt and adverse consequences resulting from race discrimination. ; see also ante, at 22, n.15 (plurality opinion). of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 316 (1986) (same). 2d 304. And I have found no case that otherwise repudiated this constitutional asymmetry between that which seeks to exclude and that which seeks to include members of minority races. This sentence reminds me of Anatole Frances observation: [T]he majestic equality of the la[w], forbid[s] rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.[Footnote 1] The Chief Justice fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not tell stories of white children struggling to attend black schools. The dissents approach confers on judges the power to say what sorts of discrimination are benign and which are invidious. PICS also argues that the lower courts neglected to apply the correct strict scrutiny standard and instead gave undo deference to the school board. Croson, 488 U. S., at 504. In 1998, it adopted the plan at issue in this case for assigning students to these schools. Parents in Louisville, Kentucky and Seattle, Washington argued that those districts' school integration programs - each of which was voluntarily adopted by local school boards to promote racial integration - violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [Footnote 17] Instead, the dissent suggests that some combination of the development of these plans over time, the difficulty of the endeavor, and the good faith of the districts suffices to demonstrate that these stark and controlling racial classifications are constitutional. Justice Breyer also tries to downplay the impact of the racial assignments by stating that in Seattle students can decide voluntarily to transfer to a preferred district high school (without any consideration of race-conscious criteria). Post, at 46. Roberts concludes his opinion for the plurality by saying: The way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race. See also Ho v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 147 F.3d 854, 865 (CA9 1998). ); brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). In 1968 our mandatory jurisdiction was defined by the provision of the 1948 Judicial Code then codified at 28 U. S.C. 1257, see 62 Stat. See also Adarand, supra, at 226 ([I]t may not always be clear that a so-called preference is in fact benign (quoting Bakke, supra, at 298 (opinion of Powell, J.))). See 377 F.3d 949, 10051006 (CA9 2004) (Parents Involved VI) (Graber, J., dissenting). Plessy, supra, at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 05908, at 137a139a. Similarly, of the 1,461 black students enrolled in the 12 senior high schools in Seattle, 1,151 (or 78.8%) attended 3 senior high schools, and 900 (61.6%) attended a single school, Garfield. This plan is in place as of 2017. Read MoreParents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle . 2d 834, 837, 864 (WD Ky. 2004). Likewise, a district may consider it a compelling interest to achieve a diverse student population. And it thereby set the Nation on a path toward pub-lic school integration. 2d 834, 837845, 855862 (WD Ky. 2004). To School Committee of Boston? Arkansas, for example, provides by statute that [n]o student may transfer to a nonresident district where the percentage of enrollment for the students race exceeds that percentage in the students resident district. Ark. The Seattle district, which has never operated legally segregated schools or Read More(2007) Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School . See App. In the cases before us it is noteworthy that the number of students whose assignment depends on express racial classifications is limited. Neither party disputes, however, that Joshuas transfer application was denied under the racial guidelines, and Merediths objection is not that the guidelines were misapplied but rather that race was used at all. at 17. If one examines the context more specifically, one finds that the districts plans reflect efforts to overcome a history of segregation, embody the results of broad experience and community consultation, seek to expand student choice while reducing the need for mandatory busing, and use race-conscious criteria in highly limited ways that diminish the use of race compared to preceding integration efforts. as Amici Curiae, with Rosen, Perhaps Not All Affirmative Action is Created Equal, N.Y. 547 U. S. __ (2006). But it explicitly cited Swanns statement that the Constitution permitted a local district to adopt such a plan. Jefferson County does not challenge our jurisdiction, Tr. Consequently, the demographics of a neighborhood school would also be the consequence of those individual choices. (explaining that the Constitution grants local school districts a significant degree of leeway). The Ninth Circuit granted rehearing en banc, 395 F.3d 1168 (2005), and overruled the panel decision, affirming the District Courts determination that Seattles plan was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, Parents Involved VII, 426 F.3d, at 11921193. The Founders meant the Constitution as a practical document that would transmit its basic values to future generations through principles that remained workable over time. 2. The District argues that its use of race in high school admissions serves three compelling government interests: (1) the educational benefits of a diverse student body; (2) the reduction of racial isolation and de facto segregation; and (3) providing equality of opportunity to all students. A federal District Court dismissed the suit, upholding the tiebreaker. 1 of King Cty., Washington, and the OCR (June 9, 1978) (filed with the Court as Exh. of New Kent Cty., 391 U. S. 430, 435 (1968) ([T]he State, acting through the local school board and school officials, organized and operated a dual system, part white and part Negro. It was such dual systems that 14 years ago Brown I[, 347 U. S. 483,] held unconstitutional and a year later Brown II[, 349 U. S. 294 (1955)] held must be abolished). Now localities will have to cope with the difficult problems they face (including resegregation) deprived of one means they may find necessary. . Race is not. In 1996, the school board adopted the present plan, which began in 1999. But that cost does not approach, in degree or in kind, the terrible harms of slavery, the resulting caste system, and 80 years of legal racial segregation. of Ed., 402 U. S. 1, 810 (1971); see also Croson, 488 U. S., at 519 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (noting that racial classifications may be the only adequate remedy after a judicial determination that a State or its instrumentality has violated the Equal Protection Clause). Three years after that decision was handed down, the Governor of Arkansas ordered state militia to block the doors of a white schoolhouse so that black children could not enter. Hence, I conclude that the plans before us pass both parts of the strict scrutiny test. Bustop, addressing in the context of an emergency injunction application a busing plan imposed by the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, is similarly unavailing. It is not clear why the racial guidelines were even applied to Joshuas transfer applicationthe guidelines supposedly do not apply at the kindergarten level. See Plessy, 163 U. S., at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. Similarly, Jefferson Countys expert referred to the importance of having at least 20 percent minority group representation for the group to be visible enough to make a difference, and noted that small isolated minority groups in a school are not likely to have a strong effect on the overall school. App. This, in turn, has consequences of its own. The agreement required the board to implement what became known as the Seattle Plan.. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334; Gratz, 539 U.S. at 27071. Not even the dissenters thought the race-conscious remedial program posed a constitutional problem. The Court has jurisdiction in these cases. Part IV (again joined only by a plurality of the Court) addressed Justice Breyer's dissent. See also Statement of Appellees Opposing Jurisdiction and Motion to Dismiss or Affirm in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1952, No. See also Bakke, 438 U.S., at 312, 313, 98 S. Ct. 2733, 57 L. E. 2d 750 (opinion of Powell, J.).". See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In Wygant, a school district justified its race-based teacher-layoff program in part on the theory that minority teachers provided role models for minority students and that a racially diverse faculty would improve the education of all students. Grutter, supra, at 352 (opinion of Thomas, J.) Although some parents or children prefer some schools over others, school popularity has varied significantly over the years. ante, at 1517 (opinion of Thomas, J.) The plurality, or at least those who follow Justice Thomas color-blind approach, see ante, at 2627 (Thomas, J., concurring); Grutter, 539 U. S., at 353354 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), may feel confident that, to end invidious discrimination, one must end all governmental use of race-conscious criteria including those with inclusive objectives. It is not one in which race-conscious limits stigmatize or exclude; the limits at issue do not pit the races against each other or otherwise significantly exacerbate racial tensions. Yet, as explained, each has failed to provide the support necessary for that proposition. Establishing a strong basis in evidence requires proper findings regarding the extent of the government units past racial discrimination. Thus, racial balancing will have to take place on an indefinite basisa continuous process with no identifiable culpable party and no discernable end point. Losing the Dream?, p. 30, fig. Id., at 38a, 103a. of Boston v. Board of Education, O.T. 1967, No. Therefore, as a general rule, all race-based government decisionmakingregardless of contextis unconstitutional. there are two compelling interests: 1. remedying the effect of past intentional discrimination 2. interest of student body diversity in higher education 1. The schools base their numbers in demographics, therefore making this goal a means to achieve a numerical quota to achieve racial balancing. See, e.g., Powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education, in Pursuit of a Dream Deferred: Linking Housing and Education Policy 15, 35 (J. Powell, G. Kearney, & V. Kay eds. The reason for this omission is clear enough, since the case did not involve any voluntary means adopted by a school district. This leads it to advance propositions that, in my view, are both erroneous and in fundamental conflict with basic equal protection principles. What the government is not permitted to do, absent a showing of necessity not made here, is to classify every student on the basis of race and to assign each of them to schools based on that classification. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200, 243, 248, n.6 (1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. The first is the compelling interest of remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination.
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